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ABSTRACT 
Fiscal federalism has been argued to intensify regional competition and promote economic growth. This 
paper is the first, to our knowledge, to empirically assess the patterns and extent of strategic tax 
competition between geographically neighboring governments in China. Using a panel data set containing 
data at the county level, we apply Anselin’s (1995) local indicator of spatial association (LISA) approach 
to statistically test the existence of local capital tax competition and examine its determining factors. We 
find heterogeneous tax competition behaviors across regions. Under decentralized fiscal structure and 
centralized merit-based governance structure, local governments have strong incentives to compete with 
each other to attract mobile capital. Counties in the coastal areas with favorable initial conditions of larger 
tax base tend to “race to the bottom” by lowering tax rates so as to create a pro-business environment. In 
contrast, the local governments in poor regions have difficulty in competing with the governments on the 
coast to attract investment and develop the local nonfarm economy. Their local revenues are sometimes 
barely sufficient to cover the salaries of civil servants on the public payroll. Consequently, they are more 
likely to levy heavy taxes on existing enterprises, worsening the business investment environment. This 
leads to a “race to the top” in raising effective tax rate in lagging regions. 
Keywords: fiscal decentralization, regional inequality, tax competition, China, economic growth.    1
1.  INTRODUCTION 
Fiscal federalism or fiscal decentralization has been widely called for to promote economic growth in 
both developed and developing countries. One key view holds that fiscal competition creates disciplinary 
pressures to preserve market incentives (Qian and Roland, 1998). A crucial assumption in the model 
developed by Qian and Roland (1998) is that all the regions are identical. In the “real world,” in particular 
in spatially large countries such as China, resource endowment differs across regions.  
One key feature of fiscal federalism is tax competition. A few theoretical studies on tax 
competition have taken this heterogeneity into account. As shown by Kanbur and Keen (1993), and 
Wilson (1991), most two-agent competition models suggest an inverse relationship between jurisdictions’ 
incentives for tax rate reduction and their tax base sizes. That is, when tax competitors differ in size, the 
one with a larger tax base is less willing to participate in tax competition, hence resulting in a higher tax 
rate. Recently, Cai and Treisman (2005) proposed an alternative model that provides opposite predictions. 
They assume that multiple regions with different sizes of endowments compete to attract mobile capital. 
Their model argues that when the differences in endowment, such as taxes bases and infrastructure, are 
large, poorly endowed regions tend to invest less in infrastructure and take part less actively in capital 
competition, as they see little hope of winning the capital competition. Both of the above two theoretical 
models suggest that under inter-juridical fiscal competition, different regions may choose different 
strategies according to their size of endowments.   
While the literature has rich evidence for the presence of tax competition among states or 
counties in the United States, and for local units in other industrialized countries (Bartik 1991, Case et al. 
1993, Brett and Pinkse 2000, Buettner 2001, Oates 2002, Hendrick et al. 2005), the empirical studies in 
developing or transition countries have been more scant, largely due to lack of data (Bardhan 2002). In 
particular, there are few studies examining whether the tax competition behavior is homogenous or not in 
developing countries that have large regional differences in resource endowment.     
China provides a good environment for empirically testing this research question. Since the 1980s 
China has adopted a series of fiscal reforms aimed at improving the fiscal contract arrangements between 
different levels of governments. After fiscal reforms, local and upper level governments shared fiscal 
revenues according to a predetermined formula (Jin et al., 2005). Fiscal decentralization created a strong 
inter-juridical competition, forcing local governments to compete with each other to protect the local tax 
revenue base and attract business investment so as to prompt economic development. Jin et al. (2005) 
empirically show that fiscal decentralization contributed to China’s rapid growth in the 1990s.  In this 
analysis, they assume the effect of fiscal decentralization is the same for all the provinces in their 
analysis. Considering China’s sheer size and large regional variation, it is highly likely that the regional 
fiscal competition behavior and related consequences will vary, as suggested by the rising regional 
inequality of the past two decades.  
In China, studies on local tax competition behaviors are rare not only because local governments 
used to lack authority over local fiscal administration, but also because the official de jure tax rate is 
identical across jurisdictions; the setting of tax tables, too—whether for locally or centrally sourced tax 
revenues⎯has been solely controlled by the central government. In such a unified tax system, the 
effective tax rates may nonetheless vary because of difference in local discretional efforts in collecting 
taxes. Although such discretional activities have been widely observed in China by many case studies 
(see, for example, Bahl 1999), very few studies have quantitatively looked at the spatial patterns of 
effective tax rate.  
The tax competition behavior is largely related to the evaluation system of officials. In China, the 
promotion of cadres is now largely based on yardstick competition in several key economic indicators, 
including attracted foreign direct investment, economic and fiscal revenue growth rates (Li and Zhou, 
2005). Compared to labor, capital is relatively scarce in most parts of rural China. Therefore, local 
officials have strong incentives to attract the more scarce capital so as to promote local economic   2
development. Providing investors with tax incentives is one of the most widely used measures by local 
government to achieve the above goal (Wei et al. 2001, Li and Lu 2004).     
By making use of a panel data set at the county level which covers a longer and more recent 
period, we attempt to empirically test whether tax competition exists or not, and if yes, whether 
competition behavior is subject to the regions’ underlying endowment. We have developed an empirical 
framework that is not only able to test the presence of intergovernmental tax competition within a 
country, but also flexible enough to reflect the variation in the degree of tax competition within different 
regions. In addition to presenting the patterns related thereto, this study empirically relates the endowment 
heterogeneity to various degrees of tax competition incentives.  
Specifically, we examine whether poorly endowed regions
1 have been disciplined by capital 
competition in the same way as richly endowed regions. For this purpose, we compare the counties in two 
distinct clusters: Each is essentially a spatial cluster of similarly endowed counties, although the sizes of 
endowments are remarkably different between clusters. It is noted that within the cluster, counties are 
homogeneous in both the endowment and the geographic location dimension, which should ensure perfect 
competition equilibrium. Our findings verify the existence of tax competition among neighboring 
counties. Furthermore, we find a difference between these two types of clusters: In the cluster with large 
endowments, competition is in a “race to the bottom,” while in the cluster with small endowments, it is in 
a “race to the top.”   Many previous studies use the terms “race to the bottom” and “race to the top” to 
address the welfare concerns of intergovernmental competition. In this paper, we borrow the terms to 
simply refer to the action of reducing tax rates or raising tax rates in the process of neighborhood 
competition.  
The negative relationship between the tax rate and the cluster-specific endowment size implies 
richly endowed clusters are more motivated to compete for capital than poorly endowed ones. Initial 
endowment determines whether spatially clustered counties will run a “race to the bottom” or a “race to 
the top” in tax rate settings. In particular, the counties with poor initial endowments are less disciplined 
by capital competition. This lends support to the hypothesis of Cai and Treisman, as described earlier. 
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, theoretical background for tax competition 
behaviors is described, and a new measure to detect tax competition at a local level is proposed. Section 3 
presents the data and the spatial and temporal patterns of local tax competition behaviors in China. Next, 
we quantitatively examine how endowment and other factors affect tax competition choices. Finally, 
implications of our empirical results are assessed, followed by a conclusion.  
                                                      
1 In this paper, both poor and poorly endowed regions refer to the units whose size of endowment is less than the national 
average.  To be more specific, they are the units with GDP per capita lower than the national average.   3
2.  RETHINKING TAX COMPETITION 
A Simple Capital Flow Model for Tax Competition 
We begin by presenting a simple model of county government behaviors, with the focus on a specific type 
of intergovernmental competition—capital tax competition. This type of interaction has been modeled as 
a “strategic choice” in analysis by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Wilson (1986), Wildasin (1989) and 
others and has also been highlight in the literature of government behaviors as indicated by Wilson (1999) 
and Brueckner (2003). In the simplest framework for capital tax competition, a county chooses the tax 
rate to maximize its objective function (Vi), which also depends on the amount of capital that resides 
within its borders (Ki). The distribution of capital among competing counties is affected by the tax rate 
that it chooses (ti) and that its competitor chooses (t-i). Thus, the county’s tax rate, ti, is partially 
determined by t-i. 
Consider a county that has only one revenue source from capital taxes. We assume that it 
maximizes a combined utility deriving from both the tax revenue and a representative citizen’s welfare. 
Its objective function can be written as:  
  (, ) [( ) , (, ) ] , ii ii ii i i Vt K UcK Gt K t K = +  (1) 
where ci denotes the representative citizen’s private consumption in county i and G the consumption of 
public good or services. Throughout this paper, equations referenced are numbered to the right of the 
equation and in parentheses as in this example: (1). In equation (1), the private consumption is affected by 
Ki through the income effect, in which more capital raises the marginal productivity of workers and thus 
the wage rate for each worker. Meanwhile, the public good provision is assumed to be fully financed by 
tax revenues (that is: having no government debts), thus Gi is a function of both ti and Ki.   
The final distribution of capital across counties has to satisfy the no-arbitrage condition. That is, 
the after-tax return to capital should be equalized in every county. Suppose ki represents capital per 
worker in county i, and  ) ( i k f  is the production function. This condition can be given by: 
  () ( ) ii i i rf k t f k t −− ′ ′ = − = −  (2) 
where  ) ( i k f ′
 is the marginal product of capital, or pre-tax return, in county i, and r is the equalized after-
tax return. When competing units are sufficiently small, they are all price takers who regard the after-tax 
return as given. Equation (2) depicts the relationship between ki and ti—the rise in ti causes a decrease in 
capital so that the marginal product of the capital stock can rise to the point where the after-tax return 
equals r.
2 Similarly, an increase in t-i decreases the level of k–i, thus causing ki to increase.  
The tax-induced capital flow depends on how the marginal product of capital changes in response 
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2 A formal proof for the statement that ki and ti are negatively correlated, assuming other things being equal, is given in the 
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It is worth noting that 
i
kk f
 is affected by the size of capital stock and other exogenous characteristics of 
county i. Therefore, the capital mobility implies that the capital stock in a particular county, Ki (note that 
i i i k n K ⋅ = ), depends on the tax rates in all the competing counties, exogenous characteristics of i (Xi), 
as well as exogenous characteristics of all other competitors (X-i). Then Ki is given by 
  (, , , ) ii i i i KK t t X X −− =  (4) 
Substituting equation (4) into (1) yields as follows: 
  ,, , ( ,,, ) [ ( ( ,, ) ) , ( , ( ,, ) ) ] ( ,, ) i i ii i i i ii i i i ii i i i ii V t tX X U c K t tX X G t K t tX X t K t tX X −− −− −− −− = +
 (5) 
which indicates that the optimal tax rate, ti, is an implicit function of t-i The solution to (5) reflects a Nash 
equilibrium in which county i chooses the tax rate that maximizes its utility function given a tax rate t-i, 
which at the same time is the best choice for its competing county given ti. Such a solution can be 
described by a tax reaction function as follows:   
  (, , ) ii i i th tX X −− =  (6) 
This tax reaction function does not explicitly reveal whether or not ti is positively related to t-i. 
Brueckner and Saavedra (2001) show that the slope of this function can be positive or negative, 
depending on which specific functional form is used. They attribute tax rate variation to the differences in 
production technology or consumer preferences. On the other hand, even though the function forms are 
identical, the level of Xi and X-i may affect the pre-tax returns  ) ( i k f ′
 and ) ( i k f − ′
, which in turn affects 
how ti reacts to the change of t-i. Therefore, without restrictive assumptions that reduce the complexity in 
the setting of this type of model, any attempt to obtain a unique relationship between ti and t-i will fail 
even under idealistic conditions of perfect capital mobility.   
Most theoretical literature is based on one key assumption—that all the counties are identical and 
choose the same optimal tax rates (Wilson 1999). Under this assumption, the theoretical models suggest 
that a positive correlation of tax rates should occur for counties with similar endowments. Another 
prominent feature of this assumption is that capital mobility imposes a potential revenue penalty on any 
single county that attempts to raise the tax rate alone. Therefore, the equilibrium tax rate is lower than it 
would be without capital competition. Simply put, tax competition would yield the clustering of low tax 
rates among counties that are rather alike. This prediction has spurred a wave of new empirical studies in 
testing the presence of tax competition or interactions in tax rate settings. As indicated before, empirical 
studies testing heterogeneous tax competition behavior are rare.       
Empirical Tests for Tax Competition 
The method that many empirical studies have applied to test the hypothesis of tax competition relies on a 
key parameter which describes how a government unit’s tax rate changes in response to a change in its 
competitors’ tax rate (Bartik 1991). Most often this parameter has been estimated based on a rather 
stringent assumption that all the units in the sample share the same responsiveness, and therefore it has 
failed to reflect the intrinsic heterogeneity of competition incentives. The approach we adopt for avoiding 
the specification bias is the local indicators of spatial association (LISA), also called the “local Moran’s 
I,” which was originally developed by Anselin (1995) and studied by Bao and Henry (1996), among 
others. In our definition, the localized tax rate correlation coefficient ρi is estimated by using an extended 
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where the subscripts 1 and 0 represent the current and last year, respectively; ti is the observed value of t 
at location i; t
* is the mean of t; wik is the spatial weight between i and k; and n is the number of observed 
units. This localized statistic fits into our research for several reasons. First, it is conveniently computable, 
even when using a cross-sectional data set. Second, it has direct and rich implications for the spatial 
distribution of data. A positive value of i ρ ö
 indicates a positive correlation. Given this result, if t1i is also 
greater than t1
*, then high values are located near to each other; otherwise, low values are clustered. On 
the other hand, a negative value of  i ρ ö
 indicates a negative spatial autocorrelation. Depending on whether 
t1i exceeds t1
*, a pattern of the spatial outlier can be determined as either a high valued unit in contrast to 
low valued neighbors or the opposite. Third, this statistic reflects the relationship between unit i’s tax rate 
and the lagged tax rates of its neighbors. This is a device that enables us to avoid a serious endogeneity 
problem caused by the simultaneity of neighboring units’ tax rate setting behaviors. We can reasonably 
assume that the lagged tax rates of neighbors are exogenous to unit i’s current tax rate. 
It is worth noting that the statistical test for the significance of local Moran’s I should be 
implemented with great caution. As shown by Anselin and many others, when the sample size is 
relatively small, the asymmetric distribution of Ii deviates away from normal, suggesting that a 
distribution-based test is largely unreliable. In this paper, we follow the suggestion of Anselin (1995) to 
take a conditional randomization or permutation approach (as described on page 96 in Anselin 1995) to 
calculate pseudo- significance levels. 
Another important concern for estimating the tax rate correlation is about how to define 
competitors. In this paper, we consider the geographic proximity as the primary standard in the definition 
of competitors. The study units of this paper are rural counties in China, which are the smallest 
administrative unit to have local autonomy of fiscal policies. Each county’s size also makes it vulnerable 
to the influence of its geographic neighbors (defined, in this case, as nearby areas or regions). In addition, 
several theoretical arguments explain that geographical proximity matters for capital tax competition. If a 
business was planning to set up in a certain jurisdiction in order to minimize transportation cost to its 
consumers, only jurisdictions within a small commuting distance could be viewed as good locations for 
such a business. Local units, even with the constraint of capital immobility, tend to mimic their 
neighbors’ tax policies, because officials are disciplined by voters who use neighboring units as 
benchmarks to judge local achievement. This creates the so-called “yardstick competition,” as illustrated 
by Besley and Case (1995). 
In the spatial econometrics literature, there is no consensus about how to define geographical 
neighbors. Several choices have been identified. As reviewed by Brett and Pinkse (2000), they include the 
following: the common boundary neighbors, great-circle neighbors, and nearest-distance neighbors. Since 
our results are generally robust in relation to any of these measures, the rest of this paper will focus on the 
“four-nearest” neighbors concept under which unit j is a neighbor of i if it is one of the four closest units 
to i. Applying this concept, we can test a spatial tax competition hypothesis that a county unit i’s tax rate 
is positively affected by the tax rate of its geographic neighbors. This conclusion is particularly consistent 
with the perfect competition model.    6
3.  THE EXISTENCE AND PATTERN OF TAX COMPETITION BEHAVIORS   
Data Description   
To provide a broad view of intergovernmental competition behaviors among grassroots administration 
units, we constructed a panel data set, consisting of 2094 rural counties and county-level municipalities
3 
for the period from 1993 to 2005. Our sample covers all the rural counties as of 1993 except a small 
portion with missing tax or income information. Technically, we have employed two procedures to ensure 
the temporal and spatial consistency of the data set. First, considering that in almost every year some 
county units have experienced boundary changes either by merging or splitting, the data after 1993 have 
been aggregated to match the county definition as of 1993, so that the analytical outcome will be 
comparable intertemporally. Second, in order to combine the economic and geographical data, we created 
a geo-coding system which links the records of various years to the county-level base map at the end of 
1993, which is derived from a 1990 China county-level administration map (provided by China In Time 
And Space—CITAS, University of Washington) using publications on administrative coverage changes 
posted on the website of the Chinese Ministry of Civil Affairs.  
As a measure of tax burdens on capital investment, we followed the method used in Knight 
(2002) to calculate the effective tax rate by first adding up all the taxes imposed on firms or business, and 
then dividing by the non-agriculture GDP, a proxy for the tax base.
4 The numerator includes two types of 
locally sourced taxes: the value-added tax (VAT) and business taxes. For these two, tax revenues are 
shared between the local and the central governments, only the proportion of the actual collection that 
eventually belongs to local control—usually 25 percent—is included in our calculation. Because in rural 
areas these taxes are mostly borne by non-agricultural production or services, we partition the GDP 
between agriculture and non-agriculture in proportion to the magnitudes of the county-specific gross 
value of industrial output (GVIO) and gross value of agriculture output (GVAO), and use non-agriculture 
GDP to approximate the tax base of capital stock.  
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3 According to China’s State Council (1986), a rural county with a total population of more than 500,000 can be approved to 
upgrade as a county-level municipality only if its annual GDP exceeds 400 million yuan and its non-agricultural population in the 
town of the county capital exceeds 120,000 people. Pu (2004) points out that the practice of upgrading a rural county to a county-
level municipality in the late 1980s and early 1990s did not place much emphasis on the division of urban and rural economies, 
and unavoidably led to the conceptual confusion between cities and rural counties. In our sample, some rural counties were 
upgraded to county-level municipalities in the years after 1993. However, in keeping with Pu’s arguments, we assume this 
upgrading process did not affect the characteristics of rural economy.       
4 The computation of GDP in the period from 1993 to 1996 is based on a linear approximation method, which is explained 
in Yao (2006).    7
As presented inFigure 1, the county-level tax rates for capital vary remarkably across the nation. 
The Gini coefficient rose to 0.73 in 1994 and slowly decreased to 0.57 from 1996 to 2000. In the period 
between 2001 and 2005, this coefficient stabilized at an even lower level—at 0.36. In a similar pattern, 
the nationwide average effective tax rate has continued to decrease at an annual rate of 9.08 percent since 
1994. The fact that both the mean and variation of the tax rate for capital decreased in the rural area seems 
to suggest a converging trend toward the bottom. Even so, the trend at the global level is still likely to 
differ from some local trends, in light of the sizable variation in county-level tax rates. 
Identification of Local Spatial Tax Competition  
To lessen the impact of autocorrelation at the temporal dimension, we considered five discontinued years 
to examine spatial tax competition: 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000 and 2002
5. Counties are assumed to take into 
account their neighbors’ tax rates in the previous year and neglect the potential impact that their own 
choices may impose on their neighbors’ future choices. Using Geoda, the spatial analysis software 
developed by Luc Anselin, we calculate local Moran’s I, defined by equation (7), and its p-value for each 
county unit year by year. The estimates not only indicate which unit’s tax choice is significantly related to 
its spatial neighbors’ tax choices, but also enable us to further classify the units with significant correlated 
tax choices into four tax strategy groups, as follows
6: “high-high” (H-H), “low-low” (L-L), “low-high” 
(L-H), and “high-low” (H-L) tax rate clusters. (Note that the description before the hyphen refers to unit i, 
and the one after the hyphen refers to its neighbors.) Among these groups, the clusters of low tax rates 
identify the counties in a race to the bottom; the clusters of high tax rates are the counties in a race to the 
top; and the clusters of dissimilar values are spatial outliers, contradicting the spatial tax competition 
hypothesis. 
Figure 2. Tax strategy distribution among 2094 rural counties in China 
 
 
Note: 1. Relative frequency is labeled above the bars and expressed in percentages.  
2. H-H=high-high; L-L=low-low, L-H=low-high; H-L=high-low 
                                                      
5 We exclude 2003 and 2004 from the analysis of local spatial tax competition behaviors because the tax rates in 2004 are 
not comparable to those in 2003 and earlier years. Firstly, the GDP estimation in 2004 was based on the results of the National 
Economic Census in 2004, while the GDP estimation for the period from 1993 to 2003 was based on the results of the National 
Economic Census in 1992. Although the State Statistic Bureau adjusted the GDP estimation for 1993 to 2002 using the latest 
census results, the county-level data after adjustment have not yet been published. Secondly, in 2003, the occurrence of a rapidly 
spread fatal disease, SARS, produced a huge impact on China’s economy. Therefore, the GDP and tax revenues in 2003 cannot 
be compared to other years. Lastly, several fiscal reforms, such as the export VAT rebate-sharing reform, and the conversion of 
VAT from a production-based tax to a consumption-based tax, started to take effect in 2004. These reforms can change local 
VAT revenues in uncertain ways.         
6 The significance level is 5 percent. Our results in subsequent sections are robust to other significance levels, such as 10 
percent.    8
In Figure 2, we compare the national distribution of tax competition strategy choices in 1994 and 
2002. In both years, the majority of the sample counties, 70.2 percent and 63.0 percent for 1994 and 2002, 
respectively, did not yield a significant tax rate correlation, implying that local tax rate decision is not 
responsive to the decision of spatial neighbors. On the other hand, out of the 1994 sample, 25.0 percent 
had a significant spatial clustering of low tax rates, 2.4 percent with a significant clustering of high tax 
rates, and 2.4 percent with a clustering of dissimilar tax rates. Comparison between the two years reveals 
an interesting trend toward more counties in a “race to the top” and fewer counties in a “race to the 
bottom,” as the percentage of H-H units increased to 8.5 percent, and the percentage of L-L units 
decreased to 23.8 percent in 2002.  
What causes the sharp difference in counties’ tax competition behaviors? In this paper, we 
investigate three factors: regional or provincial location, time, and the relationship between competitors’ 
endowments.   
Spatial and Temporal Changes 
Table 1 reports how counties with different tax competition strategies were distributed in coastal and 
inland areas.
7 It is observed, for instance, that in 1994, 301 of 524 clusters of low tax rates were located in 
the eastern coastal areas and accounted for 46.1 percent of coastal counties, while 49 of 51 clusters of 
high tax rates were in the western inland areas. Generally speaking, Table 1 suggests that the regional 
location—regardless of whether the county is located in a certain province or a region—can affect its tax 
competition strategy. We examine the provincial and regional effect by applying the Chi-square test for a 
pair of categorical variables, which hypothesizes that one categorical variable, the tax strategy choice, is 
independent of the other categorical variable, provincial or regional location. The results, as reported in 
the first two columns of Table 2, suggest that the hypothesis of there being no provincial or regional 
effect is not significantly supported by our data. This conclusion is robust across various years.  
Table 1. Distribution of tax competition strategies by region and endowment clustering group 
  Year of 
observation  H-H L-L  L-H H-L  No  response 
    1994 2002  1994 2002 1994 2002  1994 2002 1994 2002 1994  2002 
Nation  2094  2094  51 178  524  498 29 61 21 38 1469  1319 
Coastal  647 647 2  33 301  202 1  9  10 7  333 396 
Inland  1447  1447  49 145  223  296 28 52 11 31 1136  923 
E1  (H-H)  175  222  0 16  106  56 0 3 1 0 68 147 
E2  (L-L)  484  488  29  75  9 39 7 31  1 8 438  335 
E3  (L-H)  33  16 0 1 11  1  0 0 0 0 22 14 
E4  (H-L)  10  23 1 2 1 2  0 2 0 0 8  17 
E0 (No GDP 
correlation)  1392  1345  21 84 397  400 22 25 19 30 933 806 
Note: Numbers shown indicate frequency. 
                                                      
7 Following the convention of China’s Statistics Bureau, the coastal region includes Beijing, Tianjin, Hebei, Liaoning, 
Shanghai, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Guangdong, Guangxi and Hainan. The inland region includes the rest of the 19 
provinces. As shown in Table 1, our sample includes 647 counties in the coastal region, and 1,447 counties in the inland area.     9
Table 2. The chi-square test of independence for tax competition choices and spatial location 
variables 
Year 
(1) Provinces  (2) Regions  (3) Endowment clusters 
D.F.  χ2 P  value  D.F.  χ2 P  value  D.F.  χ2 P  value 
1994 30  2500 0.000  1  249.8927  0.000  4  292.77  0.000 
1996 30  2700 0.000  1  257.4119  0.000  4  382.40  0.000 
1998 30  2400 0.000  1  173.1465  0.000  4  539.90  0.000 
2000 30  2000 0.000  1  121.6528  0.000  4  332.44  0.000 
2002 30  1900 0.000  1  45.2078  0.000  4  154.19  0.000 
When it comes to the temporal effect, we conduct a number of pairwise chi-square tests to 
observe the difference in the distributions of tax competition strategy choices between two different years. 
The test results all indicate the same significant temporal changes. 
Endowments  
The concept of endowment is defined here in general terms to reflect a combination of economic 
development levels, capital stocks, natural resource endowment, and labor skills. Although a further 
breakdown into different classes of endowments may reveal more interesting and reasonable behaviors, 
the lack of data at the county level only allows us to use per capita GDP as a proxy for general 
endowments. It is hypothesized that whether a county unit and its representative competitor have large 
and closely related GDP, small and closely related GDP, or an extremely different GDP level will affect 
their choices among the five tax competition strategies.      
To explore this, four groups of significant spatial clusters as well as a group of insignificant ones 
are identified for county-level economic endowments, measured by real per capita GDP. The spatial 
clusters of economic endowments are examined in a different set of years, including 1993, 1995, 1997, 
1999 and 2001, which are one year ahead of those used in the tax competition analysis. It is worth noting 
that endowments and tax rates are studied in different periods. The purpose of using per capita GDP (as a 
proxy for endowment) in preceding years is to reduce the causal impact of tax rate on it. For simplicity, 
endowment clusters will be labeled in accordance with the tax year for the rest of this paper’s discussion 
of them.   
Notably, the clusters of high economic achievements mainly showed up in coastal areas, and 
clusters of low economic achievements were largely concentrated in western and central areas. In 1994, 
L-L GDP clusters accounted for 23.1 percent of the population, whereas H-H GDP clusters came to only 
8.3 percent. Moreover, 87.4 percent of H-H clusters were in the coastal region, while 85.9 percent of the 
L-L clusters were in the inland area. The percentages did not change much in 2002. However, it is worth 
noting that the proportion of the population that exhibited a significant and positive spatial correlation in 
GDP rose continuously in the period under study, increasing from 31.4 percent in 1994 to 33.9 percent by 
2002.  
The majority, however, do not possess such a strong connection to their neighbors. That is, in 
1994 and 2002, respectively, 66.5 and 64.2 percent of the population were not significantly correlated to 
their neighbors’ economic development. By contrast, a small number of these populations was found to 
exhibit a significant and negative correlation to their spatial neighbors in terms of economic development. 
Their share of the total population averaged 2.05 percent during this period, falling slightly from 2.1 to 
1.9 percent between 1994 and 2002.    10
To test the null hypothesis in which spatial tax rate competition is free of influence from 
endowment clusters, we construct frequency tables for each tax year using the endowment cluster type as 
the row category variable, and the tax rate cluster type as the column category variable. We then apply the 
chi-square test to see if there is a dependent relationship between the two category variables. The last five 
rows in Table 1 present the frequency tables in 1994 and 2002, indicating that the tax competition choices 
are distributed in substantially different patterns among different endowment clusters. The results of chi-
square tests, as shown in the third column of  Table 2, also suggest that the hypothesis of independence 
should be rejected, therefore supporting the presence of a statistically significant endowment cluster 
effect.   11
4.  THE CHOICE MODEL OF TAX COMPETITION STRATEGY   
In this section, we adopt a multinomial logistic regression approach to examine the factors that underlie 
the variation of tax rate competition behaviors. From a game theory perspective, the five types of tax rate 
clusters that were identified earlier reflect five potential equilibriums as to how the county government 
chooses the optimal tax rate strategy in response to its spatial neighbors’ tax choices. Suppose the five 
types of equilibriums are exhaustive in the game outcome domain. Let πij denote the probability for unit i 
to choose the j
th strategy so that πi0+ πi1 + πi2 + πi3 + πi4 = 1, where j equals 0, 1, … or 4. The 



















where yi is the choice variable for unit i, and Vij is a linear combination of variables that explains choice j.  
As for the determinant factors in the choice decisions, this paper has already provided strong 
evidence for the regional, temporal, and endowment effects. Although they are straightforward, the 
formulae and tests in the previous section of this paper share a common shortcoming in that they do not 
allow for more than one explainable variable to be taken into account. The regression approach includes 
all variables to explain the choices of tax strategies: Given that other factors have been controlled for, it is 
able to sort out how each factor affects the unit’s choice among the five competition behaviors. Therefore, 
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where subscripts i and j denote observation and choice category respectively; k denotes the endowment 
category; βj, γj, δj and φj represent choice-specific coefficients, and εij represents the disturbance term 
associated with choice j. The explanatory variables include dummy variables for the endowment cluster 
types, denoted by E
k; a dummy variable for the coastal region, denoted by R; and a vector of dummy 
variables for various years, T.           
In addition, also included in equation (9) is a vector of other economic variables, X, which 
comprises the agriculture share in GDP (AGSH) and the government employee (people employed or 
financially supported by local governments) share in population (GESH). GESH measures government 
fiscal burden. China’s government spending structure has been decentralized in the last decade. Many 
studies, including that by Zhang (2006), find that the need to finance local government’s administration 
costs—especially the salary and social welfare costs associated with government employees—can drive 
local officials into revenue-seeking behaviors. Since these financial needs are usually rigid, local 
governments are induced to value immediate revenue-raising methods such as predation in tax collection. 
GESH is therefore hypothesized as a factor to support the H-H tax rate competition.  
AGSH is a proxy for industrial structure. The impact of AGSH on the local tax rate setting can, 
however, be twofold. One technical concern is that the average tax rate will be affected by industrial 
structure when the tax table sets different rates for different economic sectors. In China’s VAT system, 
the tax rate for most manufactured products is 17 percent, and that for agricultural products is 13 percent, 
suggestive of a tax table effect that predicts lower tax rates in regions with larger agricultural share in 
GDP. On the other hand, the degree of industrialization reflects the relative importance of the 
manufacturing and agricultural sector in raising local revenue capacity and promoting GDP growth. It can 
be assumed that governments in the more industrialized regions place emphasis more on the development 
of the non-agricultural industry than on that of the agricultural sector. In China, most investment in 
agriculture comes from government sources, while capital investment in the non-agricultural sector relies   12
more on the private market
8, which tends to very competitive. Under market pressure, governments in 
regions with a higher degree of industrialization may be more willing to take part in tax competition as a 
way to support local industrial development. This preferred industry effect thus predicts higher tax rates 
in regions with a larger agricultural share in GDP. This contradicts the tax table effect, leaving our 
empirical tests to prove which one has a stronger impact in rural China.    
Table 3. Summaries of tax strategy choices and explanatory variables 
   Description  Mean  Std. dev. 
Dependent variables       
Y=H-H  Dummy for the H-H tax cluster   0.043  0.203 
Y=L-L  Dummy for the L-L tax cluster   0.247  0.432 
Y=L-H  Dummy for the L-H tax cluster   0.014  0.117 
Y=H-L  Dummy for the H-L tax cluster   0.009  0.092 
Y=insignificant correlation  No tax rate correlation  0.687  0.464 
Explanatory variables       
E1 (H-H)  Dummy for the H-H endowment cluster
*   0.107  0.309 
E2 (L-L)  Dummy for the L-L endowment cluster*    0.235  0.424 
E3 (L-H)  Dummy for the H-L endowment cluster*    0.010  0.100 
E4 (H-L)  Dummy for the L-H endowment cluster*    0.008  0.091 
E0 (insignificant correlation)  Dummy for no endowment clustering*   0.639  0.480 
Coastal  Dummy for the coastal region  0.309  0.462 
      
Year=1994 (or any other)  Dummy for a specific tax year  0.200  0.400 
      
AGSH  Agricultural GDP in every 100 yuan of total GDP*    43.043  22.867 
GESH  People employed or financially supported by local 
governments in every 100 local residents*  
3.213 2.222 
Note: * An asterisk indicates variables lagged by one year. “Std. dev.” stands for “standard deviation.” 
To avoid potential endogeneity problems, AGSH and GESH are lagged by one year, as are the 
endowment cluster indicators. Table 3 summarizes the means and standard deviations for all the variables 
to be used in the estimation. With regard to the two new variables, it shows that as an average of the five 
years studied, the agricultural sector accounted for 43.0 percent of the total GDP in rural counties, and out 
of every 100 residents, about three worked for the governments or depended on local fiscal funding.  
We adopt a “maximum likelihood method” to estimate the tax strategy choice equations and 
report the results in Table 4. In each determination equation, we report the exponentiated coefficients, 
which have an informative interpretation of relative risk ratios (RRR)
9—the ratio of the relative risk for a 
one-unit increase in the explanatory variable x to the relative risk when x is unchanged. The RRRs are 
relative to the base category, here corresponding to the no-response-to-neighbors strategy, which is 
indicated by insignificant tax rate correlations. In such a setting, we focus on how the unit-specific factors 
affect their preference for an active tax rate reaction strategy in comparison with the passive no-response 
strategy. It can be captured with precision by RRR. For instance, if an explanatory variable came with a 
                                                      
8 According to our calculations, using the China Statistical Yearbook for Fixed Assets Investment (2003), government-
sourced funds accounted for 67.8 percent of fixed assets investment in the agricultural sector, while it accounted for only 24.6 
percent of fixed assets investment in the non-agricultural sector in 2002.   
9 Gould (2000) provides a definition for RRR used in the STATA environment. It is expressed as  
) / ( / ) / 1 (
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RRR greater than one, then a marginal increase in this variable would make the associated choice more 
preferable than the base category choice. 
Table 4. Two scenarios using the multinomial logistic estimates for the tax strategy choice 
  (1)    (2) 
   Y=H-H  Y=L-L  Y=L-H  Y=H-L    Y=H-H  Y=L-L  Y=L-H  Y=H-L 
                
E1  (H-H)  0.472  2.132  3.227  4.939    0.385 1.616 4.016 6.040 
 (0.46)  (0.000**)  (0.004**)(0.000**)  (0.54) (0.000**)  (0.002**)  (0.000**) 
E2  (L-L)  3.992  0.075  3.402  0.139    2.166 0.091 2.896 0.121 
 (0.000**)  (0.000**)  (0.000**)(0.007**)  (0.000**) (0.000**) (0.000**) (0.004**) 
E3  (L-H)  0.783  0.905  0.000  2.065    1.174 0.827 0.000 2.144 
 (0.81)  (0.63)  (0.000**)(0.48)    (0.95)  (0.40)  (0.000**)  (0.46) 
E4  (H-L)  2.744  0.112  4.462  0.000    2.434 0.094 4.894 0.000 
 (0.035*)  (0.000**)  (0.005**)(0.000**)  (0.11) (0.000**)  (0.006**)  (0.000**) 
                
Coastal  0.00  1.829  0.347  1.404    0.000 1.403 0.563 1.265 
 (0.000**)  (0.000**)  (0.002**)(0.25)    (0.000**)  (0.000**)  (0.08)  (0.45) 
                
AGSH            1.117 0.981 1.029 1.014 
            (0.000**) (0.000**) (0.000**) (0.15) 
GESH            1.259 0.509 1.257 0.885 
            (0.000**) (0.000**) (0.000**) (0.32) 
                
Observation   10470    10470 
AIC*n 14406.006    12483.900 
Log likelihood 
ratio  -7163.003 
  
-6193.950 
Note: (1) Model (1) is the basic model excluding AGSH and GESH. Model (2) is the extended model including AGSH and 
GESH. (2) year dummies are omitted.  (3) p values are included in parentheses, while * indicates significant at 5%; **  
significant at 1%. 
Table 4 includes two models with and without AGSH and GESH. Compared with Model (1), 
which excludes the two variables, Model (2) significantly improves the estimation efficiency by reducing 
the AIC (Akaike information criterion) statistic from 14,406 to 12,483, and increasing the log likelihood 
ratio from -7,163 to -6,193. This suggests that the specification including these economic variables has a 
better fit. In the meantime, there are no extreme changes in the estimated effects for endowments, coastal 
location, or time changes between these two models. 
Most variables that are significant in model (1) still have a significant effect in model (2), 
whereas a few dummies for years become significant in model (2) although not in model (1). As for the 
magnitude of estimates, no change between the two models has been found large enough to convert the 
implication for influence directions. It is observed that no RRR estimate above one in one model falls 
below one in the other model or vice versa. For instance, in the H-H tax rate strategy equation, the RRR 
of the L-L GDP cluster declines from 3.99 in model (1) to 2.17 in model (2). In spite of the difference in 
magnitude, the fact that both of them are greater than one suggests that a switch into the L-L GDP cluster 
generally causes a county to prefer the H-H tax rate strategy more than the no-response strategy. Because   14
of the reasons outlined above, we focus on model (2) to discuss the implications of tax competition 
behaviors. 
As indicated by the first column in model (2), several variables, L-L, L-H, and H-L GDP clusters, 
AGSH, and GESH significantly increase the relative risk (preference) for the choice of the H-H tax 
strategy over the base choice. The only variable significantly depressing the preference for the H-H tax 
strategy over the no-response strategy is the coastal region dummy. For our purposes, the estimate for the 
H-H GDP cluster is not significant, but its magnitude of 0.39 indicates that this GDP cluster may 
discourage the H-H tax strategy. 
It is more enlightening to compare the first two columns in model (2). On the one hand, all the 
variables that increase the relative preference for the H-H tax strategy tend to lower the relative 
preference to the L-L tax strategy. On the other hand, the variables that raise the relative preference for 
the L-L tax strategy also include those that lower the relative preference for the H-H tax strategy. 
Examples are the L-L GDP cluster and coastal region dummy, respectively. Simply put, the first group of 
variables supports the H-H tax rate competition in particular, but does not support L-L tax rate 
competition; the second group behaves in a converse manner. To make this point clear, we ran the 
multinomial logistic regression again using the H-H tax competition strategy as the basic choice. These 
results are shown in Table 5.  
Table 5. Tests for factors that support choosing the L-L over H-H tax strategies 
   1994-2002 
Variable  RRR (L-L vs. H-H)  P-value 
E1 (H-H)  4.195  (0.362) 
E2 (L-L)  0.042  (0.000**) 
E3 (L-H)  0.704  (0.884) 
E4 (H-L)  0.039  (0.000**) 
Coastal 3.51E+09  (0.000**) 
AGSH 0.878  (0.000**) 
GESH 0.404  (0.000**) 
According to Table 5, the H-H GDP cluster was a stark contrast to the L-L GDP cluster during 
1994-2002: the H-H GDP cluster belongs to the group supporting the L-L competition behaviors, while 
the L-L GDP cluster belongs to the other. This implies that the racing-to-the-bottom tax behaviors largely 
apply to homogeneous competitors with relatively large endowments, rather than all the homogeneous 
competitors. More importantly, this also implies that the existence of homogeneous competitors with 
small endowments seems to constitute one of the driving forces behind the emergence of races to the top, 
indicating that they might have a penchant for high tax rates over capital inflows. 
Also shown in Tables 4 and 5, both AGSH and GESH are in the club of factors that induce the H-
H competition behaviors. This association provides support to our hypothesis about GESH and, at the 
same time, proves that, concerning AGSH, the preferred industry effect counteracts the tax table effect. 
Figures 3a and 3b depict how the increase in AGSH affects the probability of choosing the H-H and L-L 
tax competition. It is clearly shown in these two figures that regardless of whether a county belongs to the 
H-H or L-L GDP cluster, a rise in the agricultural share of GDP increases its probability of choosing the 
H-H tax competition, but decreases its probability of choosing the L-L tax competition. In a striking 
threshold pattern, both of the H-H competition probability curves begin to rise steeply immediately after 
the agricultural share in GDP reaches 60 percent. This suggests that counties that have reached a certain 
degree of industrialization tend to care more about capital flow and dislike the option of the H-H tax   15
competition, even when they are in a cluster of poor endowments. Also observed in Figures 3a and 3b, the 
curve for L-L GDP clusters displays a steeper slope than that for H-H GDP clusters in Figure 3a, but a 
less steep slope in Figure 3b. This indicates a substantial difference in how the economic structure can 
affect different GDP clusters.  
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The impact of GESH on the probability of choosing H-H and L-L tax competition behaviors, as 
shown in Figures 4a and 4b, is similar to that of AGSH except that the probability curves for L-L tax 
competition behaviors (See Figure 4b) exhibit a threshold pattern in which a government employee share 
greater than 9 out of 100 would prevent both GDP clusters from taking part in L-L tax competition. 
Figure 4a. The impact of the government employee share in population on tax competition 
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Figure 4b. The impact of the government employee share in population on tax competition 
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Last but not least, it is surprising to find in Table 4 that, in the last two columns in model (2), the 
homogeneous GDP clusters (H-H or L-L GDP clusters) also have greater propensity to choose 
substantially dissimilar tax rates. What drives the similarly situated competitors to adopt diverging tax 
decisions is a question that we are unable to empirically sort out with the current data set, because there 
are too few observations for heterogeneous tax rate strategies.   17
5.  CONCLUSION 
Tax competition is a key feature of fiscal federalism or fiscal decentralization. However, empirical 
evidence on the spatial patterns of tax competition in the presence of heterogeneity in developing 
countries is lacking. Based on a unique county-level panel data set in rural China, this paper makes use of 
a state-of-the-art geographic statistical method, LISA, and a sequence of rigorous statistical tests, to 
describe the patterns of localized tax rate correlations. The approach has emphasized the possibility of 
heterogeneous local behaviors by allowing for an estimation of spatial tax rate correlations at every 
individual location. Just as for most studies in the empirical literature on tax competition, we take into 
account the nearest neighborhood effect of local tax rate determination. Applying LISA to our data, we 
find strong evidence for spatial clustering of tax rates in some regions, but weak or no tax competition in 
others. As noted, the relationships between neighboring tax rates are found to vary across five distinct 
groups. In other words, tax competition behaviors are not globally uniform.  
In the second step of the empirical study, we examine the determinants of location-specific 
competition behaviors. The regional effect is statistically significant, either in a univariate or multivariate 
model. Our finding shows that the coastal region is a factor that profoundly contributes to the choice of L-
L tax strategy over other strategies. This suggests that the tax reduction method is more effective in 
attracting direct capital investment in the coastal region than in the inland region. This tendency may be 
due to the huge differences between coastal and inland regions—the differences in supportive policies, 
transportation, and human capital stocks, to name a few. In China, the reform toward a market-oriented 
open economy was started in coastal provinces and gradually applied to inland provinces; therefore, the 
market system has matured more in the coastal region. At the same time, because of its unique 
geographical and historical composition, the coastal region–with a convenient transportation system and a 
fast spreading entrepreneurial spirit—has a big advantage in promoting industrial and business 
development.     
The other factor, and probably of greater importance, is the relationship of endowments between 
competitors. As suggested by various theories, the different endowment levels can trigger strategic tax 
rate settings rather than a unique equilibrium. According to our results, the tax competition behaviors 
differ not only between symmetrically endowed units and asymmetrically endowed units, but they also 
differ between symmetric units at different endowment levels. During the rather long period of 1994-
2002, the clustered rich units were in a competition to reduce tax rates, while the clustered poor units 
were in a competition to raise tax rates.  
Although few theoretical studies to date have recognized, let alone interpreted, the “race to the 
top” behaviors in raising effective tax rate among poor counties, these behaviors can also be reasonably 
explained by several simple intuitions. First of all, poor counties in China are faced with much tighter 
budget constraints than rich counties, so the pressure to self-finance the basic spending needs probably 
prevented them from taking active actions on tax reduction. Instead of creating enabling investment 
environments, the poor counties may be involved in predatory tax practices against the industrial and 
business sectors. To a large extent, the fixed cost to run a local government is rather similar across 
regions. Under fiscal decentralization, the burden to finance the fixed cost compared to local revenue 
bases in the poor regions is heavier than that in the rich regions. As shown in Zhang (2006), the rigid 
governance structure, coupled with fiscal decentralization forces, leads some local governments in the 
lagging regions to impose higher average tax rates on capital investment. 
Secondly, it is inevitable that regions comprised of poor counties in clusters are likely to 
encounter poorly maintained public facilities, undereducated workers, and weak consumption demand. 
The adverse investment environment in the area can exert a negative externality on the business 
development for every single county within the region, thereby discouraging these counties from being 
involved in capital competition. Last but not least, because the intergovernmental transfer policies in 
general favor regions with lower revenue capacity (Yao 2006), poor counties may devote more of their 
energies in securing central transfers instead of engaging in tax rate reduction, even though the latter is   18
expected to induce more direct investment and boost fiscal capacity in the long run.  Such a choice can be 
prevalent among local governments that expect that a rise in tax rate can lead to a smaller size of local 
revenue in the near future.  
The divergent behaviors between rich and poor counties may have important implications for 
development policies. The higher tax rate in the poor counties will prevent them from attracting more 
capital investment, which in turn will further widen the gap with the rich counties on the coast. At this 
point, our finding supports the theoretical predictions in Cai and Treisman (2005). In addition to the 
endowment effect, we also find that the local government’s fiscal burden also matters to the tax 
competition behavior. Consequently, the central and provincial governments that attempt to unleash 
competitive incentives within the poor regions should also consider reforming the governance structure 
and subsidizing the fixed cost of running a government in the poor areas.   19
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